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IS I. INTRODUCTION 
16 Before the court is Defendant Amazon.com, Inc.' s ("Amazon") Federal Rule of 
17 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Sandy Routt's complaint for failure 
18 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Mot. (Dkt. # 10).) Having considered 
19 the motion, the parties' submissions filed in support and opposition thereto, the 
20 applicable law, and considering itself fully advised, the court GRANTS the motion and 
21 DISMISSES the complaint with leave to amend within IS days (DIct. # 10). 
22 II 
ORDER-l 
1 II. BACKGROUND 
2 This is a copyright infringement case brought by Plaintiff Sandy Routt against 
3 online retailer Amazon.com. Ms. Routt holds various copyrights, which she alleges 
4 Amazon's "affiliates" infringed. These "affiliates" are operators of independent web sites 
5 participating in Amazon's Associates Program. Through this program, Associates can 
6 advertise Amazon products and earn advertising fees for purchases made by end users 
7 who click through to Amazon. (Dec. of Garth Skovgard (Dkt. # 11), Ex. A ~~ 1, 7.) 
8 Amazon has around three million of these Associates. (Mot. at 8.) The question now 
9 before the court is whether Amazon can be liable when one of these Associates infringes 
10 a third party's intellectual property rights. 
11 Plaintiff Ms. Routt is a mixed-media artist and designer of jewelry , apparel, and 
12 collectible items. (Compi. (Dkt. # 4) ~ 4.) She created, owns, and operates the website 
13 SandysBeachGifts.com. (Id.) On her website, she displays pictures of the items that are 
14 for sale, which she allegedly took herself. (Id. ~ 5) Ms. Routt has filed multiple 
15 applications for copyright protection with the United States Copyright Office directed to 
16 the various photographs she has created and uses on her website. (Id.; Compi. Ex. A.) 
17 Ms. Routt alleges that several of these Associate websites displayed her 
18 photographs without her permission. (Compi. ~ 9.) Although the Associate websites 
19 display copies of these photographs, "when an attempt is made to purchase one of the 
20 products through the website, the website informs the purchaser that the depicted product 
21 is not available and then suggests alternate products, not sourced by Ms. Routt, that can 
22 be purchased instead." (Id. ~ 10.) Ms. Routt seeks to recover for tins behavior not from 
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1 the Associates, but from Amazon. Amazon moves to dismiss Ms. Routt's claims under 
2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Ms. Routt has not properly alleged 
3 that Amazon is vicariously, directly, or contributorily liable for the actions of its 
4 Associates. 
5 Ms. Routt filed this complaint against Amazon alleging three causes of action: (1) 
6 copyright infringement; (2) violation of the Lanham Act; and (3) violation of the 
7 Washington Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"). 
8 III. ANALYSIS 
9 A. 
10 
Pleading Standard Under the Federal Rules, Twombly, and Iqbal 
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
11 the pleader is entitled to relief .... " Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this rule is 
12 to '''give the defendant fair notice of what ... the claim is and the grounds upon which it 
13 rests.'" Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 
14 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
15 Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal establish the federal civil pleading standard used to 
16 assess Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
17 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Under the Twombly/Iqbal 
18 standard, it is not enough that a claim to relief be merely "possible" or "conceivable." 
19 Instead, it must be "plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 
20 U.S. at 570). A claim for relief is plausible on its face when "the plaintiff pleads factual 
21 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
22 for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This standard is 
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1 "not alan to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
2 defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. To cross the line from conceivable to plausible, a 
3 complaint must contain a sufficient quantum of "factual matter" alleged with a sufficient 
4 level of specificity to raise entitlement to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 
5 550 U.S. at 555. The court is not bound to accept as true labels, conclusions, formulaic 
6 recitations of the elements, or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Twombly, 
7 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). As the Supreme 
8 Court said in Iqbal, a complaint must do more than tender '''naked assertions' devoid of 
9 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
10 557). 
II In ruling on a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion, a court may consider documents incorporated 
12 by reference into the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion 
13 for sunrmary judgment. See Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d 977,980 (9th Cir. 2002); 
14 Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
15 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34[2] (3d ed.l999). Even if a document is not 
16 attached to the complaint, it may be incorporated by reference into a complaint if the 
17 plaintiff refers extensively to it or it forms the basis of the plaintiffs claim. See Van 
18 Buskirk, 284 F.3d at 980; Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449,453-54 (9th Cir.l994), 
19 overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 
20 2002). Here, for example, the court can consider the Amazon Associates Agreement to 
21 decide whether Ms. Routt states plausible claims because it is explicitly referenced in the 
22 complaint and forms the basis of Ms. Routt's claims. (See Compl. ~ 8.) 
ORDER-4 
1 B. Vicarious Liability 
2 Ms. Routt fails to state a plausible claim that Amazon is vicariously liable for its 
3 Associates' copyright infringement, trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, or 
4 violations of the CPA. For any of these causes of action, vicarious liability requires some 
5 version of an agency relationship. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'! Servo Ass 'n, 494 FJd 788, 
6 802 (9th Cir. 2007) (copyright); 1-800 Contacts. Inc. V. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 
7 1151,1183 (D. Utah 2010) (trademark); Stephens V. OmniIns. Co., 159 P.3d 10,27 
8 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (CPA). This means Amazon can be liable for its Associates' 
9 conduct only if it exercises a sufficient level of control over the Associates with respect 
10 to the infringing activities. Perfect 10,494 F.3d at 802 (requiring "the right and ability to 
II supervise the infringing conduct" for vicarious liability in copyright); 1-800 Contacts, 
12 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (requiring "control over form and substance" of infringing 
13 content for vicarious liability under the Lanham Act); Stephens, 159 P.3d at 27 ("The 
14 right to control is indispensable to vicarious liability" for a CPA claim.). 
15 Ms. Routt simply has not alleged sufficient facts for the court to infer that Amazon 
16 had control over the infringing actions of its Associates. As a starting point, the Amazon 
17 Associates Agreement states that Associates are "solely responsible" for the content of 
18 their websites and for ensuring that their content "does not infringe, violate, or 
19 misappropriate" the intellectual property rights of any person (Dec!. of Garth Skovgard 
20 (Dkt. # 11) Ex. A at 3), that Amazon "will have no liability for these matters" (id.), and 
21 that Associates are "independent contractors, and nothing in this Operating 
22 Agreement ... will create any partnership, joint venture, agency, franchise, sales 
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1 representative, or employment relationship" between Amazon and its Associates (id. at 
2 6). More importantly, Ms. Routt does not allege sufficient non-conclusory factual matter 
3 to state a plausible claim that the relationship between Amazon and its Associates is 
4 anything other than the relationship described in the Agreement. (See generally CompI.) 
5 She makes no specific allegations that would allow the court to reasonably infer that 
6 Amazon had control over its Associates or over their allegedly infringing activities. (See 
7 id.) Instead, she tenders only "'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual 
8 enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
9 Ms. Routt makes only one colorable argument that Amazon has control over its 
10 Associates' infringing activities, but the Ninth Circuit has already rejected her argument. 
11 Ms. Routt argues that Amazon has control over its Associates because Amazon has 
12 policies requiring compliance with intellectual property laws and can terminate 
13 Associates who violate those policies. (Resp. (Dkt. # 15) at 7-8.) We are not free to 
14 indulge this argument because the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected an identical argument 
15 in Perfect la, holding that this was not a sufficient level of control to hold a defendant 
16 vicariously liable. 494 F.3d at 802-04; see also Perfect la, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 
17 F.3d 701,730-32 (9th Cir. 2007). Ms. Routt's argument does not change the fact that she 
18 alleges no specific facts suggesting Amazon has control over the infringing activities of 
19 its Associates. As a result, there is no basis for holding Amazon vicariously liable for its 
20 Associates' illegal conduct. 
21 Factually, this case is very similar to Sellify, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., where the 
22 Southern District of New York dismissed an action against Amazon based on alleged 
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1 wrongdoing by participants in the same Amazon Associates progranl at issue here. No. 
2 09 Civ. 10268,2010 WL 4455830 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010). The claims in SellifY were 
3 Lanham Act claims and state claims for unfair competition, false advertising, and unfair 
4 trade practices. Id. at *1. For reasons similar to those outlined above, the court in SellifY 
5 granted summary judgment to Amazon, holding that Amazon was not vicariously, 
6 directly, or contributorily liable for the unlawful acts of its Associates. Id. at *2-4. 
7 SellifY does not directly control this case, but the court fmds it highly persuasive in 
8 reaching the conclusion that Ms. Routt fails to state a claim on which relief can be 
9 granted. 
10 C. 
11 
Direct Liability 
Ms. Routt also fails to state a plausible claim that Amazon is directly liable for 
12 copyright infringement. To state a claim for direct copyright infringement, a plaintiff 
13 must allege, among other things, unlawful copying by the defendant. Dream Games of 
14 Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983,995-96 (9th Cir. 2009). Ms. Routt's complaint 
15 mainly alleges unlawful copying not by Amazon, but by its Associates. (See Compl. 
16 ~~ 9-10.) To the extent it alleges unlawful copying by Amazon, it does so only in a 
17 conclusory, formulaic fashion and with no specificity. (See, e.g., Compl. ~ 12 
18 ("Defendant has willfully committed copyright infringement .... ").) Thus, the 
19 complaint is insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion with respect to direct 
20 copyright infringement. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 
21 265,286 (1986». 
22 
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1 The same reasoning applies to Ms. Routt's CPA claim. To state a CPA claim, a 
2 plaintiff must establish, among other things, an "unfair or deceptive act or practice." See 
3 Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 
4 1986). Most of Ms. Routt's complaint is dedicated to alleging such acts by Amazon's 
5 Associates, but at one point in the complaint Ms. Routt makes one allegation of direct 
6 wrongful conduct by Amazon: she alleges that Amazon "falsely suggest[ edl a 
7 connection between Ms. Routt's photographs of her genuine products on the one hand, 
8 and its own websites on the other to promote the sales of their competing goods .... " 
9 (CompI. ~ 18.) She explains (not in her complaint, but in her response to this motion) 
10 that she believes Amazon is engaged in a far-reaching "scam" whereby Amazon and its 
11 associates bait and switch online consmners "[b]y pretending to offer attractive, but in 
12 reality unavailable, products on their websites," thus attracting visitors to their sites, then 
13 directing them "toward Amazon where, it is hoped, the customers may place an actual 
14 order for a similar, but in actnality different, product." (Resp. at 3.) If this were true, 
15 Amazon might be liable under the CPA. See Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 533. 
16 However, as the complaint is now written, it does not come close to pleading enough 
17 factnal matter to state a plausible claim for relief under this theory. (See CompI.) In 
18 particular, the complaint contains no specific factnal allegations suggesting Amazon is 
19 engaged in this behavior, that its official policies do anything but discourage 
20 lawbreaking, or that it masterminded this far-reaching "scam." (See id.) In short, neither 
21 of Ms. Routt's claims for direct liability state a plausible claim upon which relief can be 
22 granted. 
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1 D. Contributory Liability 
2 Finally, Ms. Routt fails to state a claim for contributory liability under either 
3 copyright laws or the Lanham Act because she alleges no specific facts that would 
4 support a contributory liability theory. (See Compl.) To state a claim for contributory 
5 copyright liability, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant "intentionally induc[ ed] or 
6 encourager ed] direct infringement." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
7 Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Contributory liability under the Lanham Act similarly 
8 requires intentional inducement with knowledge of infringement. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. 
9 Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982). But Ms. Routt's only allegations of 
10 inducement or encouragement to infringe are conclusory (see Compl. ~ 12 ("Defendant 
11 has willfully committed copyright infringement ... by inducement, or by way of 
12 contributory liability.")), and the only other allegations that could support an inference of 
13 inducement or encouragement are Ms. Routt's claims ofa far-reaching scam. As 
14 discussed above, this theory is not alleged with sufficient specificity to survive a Rule 
15 12(b)(6) motion. (See Compl. ~ 18; Resp. at 3.) 
16 IV. CONCLUSION 
17 Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS Amazon's motion to dismiss the 
18 complaint (Dkt. # 10) with leave to amend within 15 days of the date of this order. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
.\.t.,. 
Dated this ~~ day of November. 
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JAMES . ROBART 
United St tes DistrictI udge 
